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ABSTRACT 
Security through decentralization and reliability are the main values that Blockchain technology brings to supply 
chain management. The increased security in the form of the shared ledger could potentially eliminate a myriad of 
audits required by systems and processes in supply chain management. This paper focuses on two theories to explain 
two key supply chain management factors including supplier customization and confidential information sharing. 
Smart Contracts are used to explain the security of Blockchains in supplier customization. Trust, cooperation, and 
reverse logistics are further explored to explain how security in Blockchain can be used for information sharing. 
Keywords: Blockchain, Supply Chain, Smart Contracts, Trust, Reverse Logistics 
INTRODUCTION 
Blockchain technology is being touted as the panacea to all that is lacking in security, cost, and simplicity for 
industries ranging from Financial, Supply Chain, Healthcare, and beyond.  The Blockchain is becoming a trusted 
intermediary (Koul, 2018) as industries are looking to new technologies embrace ‘disruption’ caused by new 
technologies.  Tapscott and Tapscott (2016) boldly state that Blockchains have the potential to revolutionize the 
world economy. 
This paper will explore the potential shift to Blockchain technology as a primary information exchange protocol for 
the supply chain overtaking the current dominant protocols established by the Supply Chain between trading 
partners. The Blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions programmed to record not just 
financial transactions but virtually everything of value; additional trust through the secure transaction is a key 
element (Bambara & Allen, 2019; Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016).  The name “Blockchain” was coined for the way the 
technology stores transaction data — in blocks that are linked together to form a chain. Blocks record and confirm 
the time and sequence of transactions that are logged within a discrete network governed by rules agreed on a priori 
by the network participants. Each block contains a hash, a digital fingerprint. The hash of the previous block is 
linked to the next and this arrangement prevents any block from being altered and to be immutable. In summary, 
Blockchain is not a replacement for business process, transaction processing, or a database but serves as a database 
for recording transactions. The essential value of the Blockchain is a decentralized, trustable, collectively maintain, 
reliable, and open-source database  (Bambara & Allen, 2019; Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016; Werbach, 2018). 
Blockchain research to date has been focused on the use case to support bitcoin described by Lo and Wang (2014) as 
the dominant virtual currency.  Research is limited to the adoption of Blockchain in Supply Chain and the potential 
for both customer and company benefits.  The implication of mass adoption of the technology could not only disrupt 
the industry-standard protocol for information transfer but also provide a value proposition influencing consumer 
behavior. The element of the technology, which provides differentiating factors of transaction cost in Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE) theory and trust as addressed in Social Exchange Theory (SET) as constructs focus on smart 
contract code automating actions based on scenarios developed or selected in the overall exchange process.  
THEORY 
While much attention focuses on simply “disruption” of new technologies on an industry, we draw two different 
theoretical perspectives to explain the possible invasion of Blockchain technology in the supply chain. Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE) theory involves a transaction cost, a cost incurred in making an economic exchange, for 
example, costs required to come to an acceptable agreement with the other party to the transaction, drawing up an 




The cost of establishing a supposedly "tamper-proof" contract, and the costs of monitoring and enforcing the 
implementation of the contract is a crucial factor in supply chain management. This is shown in Figure 1, which was 
adopted from Liang, & Huang, 1998). Such coordination costs are defined as the costs of "all the information 
processing necessary to coordinate the work of people and machines that perform the primary processes," whereas 
production costs include the costs incurred from "the physical or other primary processes necessary to create and 
distribute the goods or services being produced" (Kumar, Van Dissel, & Bielli, 1998). According to Transaction 
Cost Economics, asset specificity is a key driver of transaction costs and the relationship between supply chain 
partners (Devaraj, Vaidyanathan, & Mishra, 2012). Asset specificity has emerged as a reliable and consistent 
predictor of inter-organizational relationships and sourcing decisions (Poppo & Zenger, 1998). Asset specificity is 
related to alternative uses of the asset involved in the transaction, and it is measured by the lack of standardization. 
In our context, asset specificity can be operationalized as supplier customization. The extent to which a supplier has 
customized its assets, processes, and tools to meet a buyer’s requirements is a significant indicator of its 
commitment to meet the idiosyncratic requirements of the buyer and is a key economic factor (Devaraj, 
Vaidyanathan, & Mishra, 2012). 
 
Social Exchange Theory (SET) culminates in economics, psychology, and sociology. The theory was developed to 
understand the social behavior of humans in economic undertakings. Although social exchange theory was 
originally proposed in the context of interpersonal relationships, many of its propositions are well suited for 
analyzing the inter-organizational exchange relationship between two firms (Son, Narasimhan, & Riggins, 2005). 
According to SET, pure economic factors are insufficient to explain inter-organizational relationships, and social 
factors inform why firms engage in extensive coordination in the interests of maintaining long term relationships 
(Devaraj, Vaidyanathan, & Mishra, 2012). In our context, we have conceptualized trust as the key social factor that 
may influence the onset of Blockchain technology in supply chain management as shown in Figure 2, adopted from 
Son, Narasimhan, & Riggins, 2005). 
 
\  
Scholars have acknowledged communication as an essential factor in supply chain management and suggested that 
product customization and information sharing constitute key characteristics in e-procurement processes (Chen et 
al., 2004; Doney & Cannon, 1997; Muffato & Payaro, 2004; Subramani, 2004). Trust, "a firm's belief that another 
 
 
company will perform actions that will result in positive outcomes for the firm, as well as not take unexpected 
actions that would result in negative outcomes for the firm" (Anderson, &  Narus, 1990, p, 45), is an important 
aspect of interfirm exchange relationships. Trust can be viewed as one party's confidence in the reliability and 
integrity of an exchange partner (Morgan & Hunt, 1994).  
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF KEY SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT FACTORS 
 
Doney and Cannon (1997) argue that supplier customization and confidential information sharing are among the two 
most important characteristics in inter-organizational relationships and the coordination of supply chain activities. 
Supplier customization refers to the dedicated assets such as tools and equipment and custom-made processes that a 
supplier devotes to the buyer firm. The customization efforts are indicative of the willingness of the supplier to 
conform to the needs of the buyer. Supplier customization includes initiatives on the part of the supplier to acquire 
specialized equipment in order to manufacture customized and tailored products and to modify internal processes to 
conform to the needs of the buyer (Doney & Cannon, 1997). From a transaction costs economics perspective, such 
customization initiatives constitute asset specificity. Because procedures, assets, and tools are customized to a 
specific buyer, their economic value and salvage potential are considerably less if they are switched to alternative 
transactions. Thus, asset specificity tends to promote supplier-buyer relationship on economic grounds. From the 
buyer’s standpoint, supplier customization allows modifying the supply of products rapidly in response to changing 
customer needs. For instance, Hsieh, Chiu, & Hsu (2008) claim that market-oriented suppliers from Taiwan 
emphasize the customization of their processes to satisfy their customers. In the consumer electronics sector, for 
example, buyers welcome flexibility because of their need for a high level of customization and frequent changes in 
product mix and delivery. Supplier arrangements and customizations enable buyer firms to appropriately structure 
inter-organizational information flows and coordinate procurement processes, thereby reducing the effort necessary 
for resolving external uncertainties (Gosain, Malhotra, & El Sawy, 2005). In general, customization can be 
described from two perspectives including a process perspective and a content perspective. The process perspective 
concerns how customized products are developed (Fettermann & Echeveste, 2014 ). The content perspective focuses 
on different aspects of the actual customization such as if it is related to whether the properties of the product are 
unique to a particular customer order or whether the product only has standard properties that are the same 
irrespective of the customer (Lampel & Mintzberg, 1996). Kakela and Wikner (2018) define individualized 
customization as a customized solution that is defined after commitment to the customer with no predefined 
solutions as options. This is different from modularization and mass customization where suppliers design or 
engineer possible solutions in advance (Fogliatto, Da Silveira, & Borenstein, 2012). 
 
Social exchange scholars present various social rationales for why buyers and suppliers' partnerships might continue 
to sustain a relationship in contrast to the economic rationale of transaction cost economics. In this theory, supply 
chain partners will engage in information sharing if it helps to foster their relationship. The history of a relationship 
is a significant driver of commitment to a relationship. The length of successful collaboration between two firms 
will determine the likelihood to engage in activities such as information sharing that benefit the relationship 
(Seabright, Levinthal, & Fichman, 1992). Moreover, reputation is an important attribute in supply chain 
relationships (Kollock, 1994). In a systematic procurement arrangement where regular transactions are expected to 
occur on a long-term basis via negotiated contracts with qualified suppliers, organized information transfer between 
the trading partners may be crucial to achieving efficiency in recurring transactions (Kim, Umanath, & Kim, 2005). 
The information-sharing capabilities include the integration of the systems, decisions, and processes (Hsu, Kannan, 
Tan, & Leong, 2008). The availability of information allows firms to sense the need for change in their current 
process configuration and to develop mechanisms for dealing with change. This is particularly useful for supplier 
customization efforts as firms that exchange information with suppliers extensively can respond to demand changes 
with agility. Frequent information exchange between a firm and its suppliers encourages the firm to share both 
tactical information (e.g., engineering change orders, reject rates, inventory positions), and strategic information 
(e.g., product roadmap, demand forecast, cost curves) with suppliers (Devaraj, Vaidyanathan, & Mishra, 2012). 
Such detailed information sharing enables the buyer and its suppliers to coordinate their design efforts, production 
plans, and shipping schedules more effectively. Cachon and Fisher (2000)  found that the sharing of real-time 
demand information provides significant operational improvements. In addition to providing operational savings, 
firms have come to realize that sharing information with business partners can facilitate meeting customers’ needs in 
a timely manner. The exchange of information with suppliers enables buyer firms to communicate customer 




Young-Ybarra and Wiersema (1999) state that trust between buyers and suppliers will have a positive impact on the 
desire and ability of partners to adjust to changing environmental demands. Higher levels of trust in business 
partners indicate that an organization believes in the competence or expertise of its partners to deliver. The trusting 
organization also expects that the trusted party will not take advantage of the contractual conditions by willful 
exploitation (Young-Ybarra & Wiersema, 1999). While increased information sharing enables suppliers and buyers 
to be flexible to customer demands (Rosenzweig, Roth, & Dean, 2003), Handfield and Bechtel (2002) argue that 
firms are more willing to be responsive to partners who have exhibited trustworthiness. The cooperative behavior 
facilitated by higher trust enables firms to survive greater stress and display adaptability under changing conditions 
(Doz, 1996; Lorenz, 1988). Higher trust between partners lowers transaction risks and information abuse online by 
partners and increases the chances that contractual terms will be honored online, and hence is likely to enhance the 
relationship between information sharing and flexibilities in supply chain management. 
 
In general, customization costs will reduce the profits of suppliers. Engaging in close communication based on 
collaborative relationships between buyers and suppliers will promote information-sharing. Information-sharing 
between buyers and suppliers could reduce customization costs (Nakagawa & Song, 2016). We use smart contracts 
to explain the security of Blockchains in supplier customization. Trust, cooperation, and reverse logistics are 
explored to explain how security in Blockchain can be used for information sharing. 
 
BLOCKCHAIN IMPLICATION ON SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 
 
Based on the above theoretical perspectives of key supply chain management factors, we will develop implications 
of Blockchain technology in supply chain management. In a recent survey of almost 3,000 global C-suite executives, 
IBM found that a significant 33 percent of organizations, on average, across all industries and regions are already 
considering or actively engaged with Blockchains (IBM, 2017). The Explorers, organizations that are already 
experimenting with, piloting, or implementing Blockchains are finding that Blockchain technology is likely to 
radically change how their organizations operate, generate revenues, and respond to customers, partners, and 
competitors alike (IBM, 2017).  
 
In this theoretical exploration, we explore three attributes of supply chain management and their implications with 
Blockchain technology including supply chain contracts, trust in supply chains, and reverse logistics.  
 
Supply Chain Contracts 
Mentzer, DeWitt, Keebler, Min, Nix, Smith, and Zacharias (2001, pg. 6) define supply chain management as 
activities “to integrate and manage the sourcing, flow, and control of materials using a total systems perspective 
across multiple functions and multiple tiers of suppliers”. When supply chain management intends to provide 
coordination and facilitate collaboration between buyers and suppliers with respect to the flows of goods and 
services and corresponding financial resources, it is eventually summarized into enforceable contracts between the 
two parties. While the trust and the enforceability of the contracts form the foundation of effective supply chain 
management, information asymmetry between the parties and the related agency costs for monitoring and assurance 
function require significant resources from both parties (Lajili & Mahoney 2006). Notably, the economic burden of 
transaction costs through supply chains escalates as the supply chain becomes longer, more complex by involving 
multiple tiers of suppliers, and more global.  
 
Notably, Blockchain technology as an enabler of smart contracts can ameliorate the concern of increasing 
transaction costs along the supply chain. Initially, Szabo (1996) has developed the notion of a smart contract as the 
digital promises and protocols where the parties execute on them (Bambara & Allen, 2018). These contracts become 
a social form of ‘trust’ through transparency fulfilling a historical model of a “social contract’ without the potential 
or need for enforcement by a government or a certified authority (Szabo, 1996; Bandzar 2016). Once supplier 
arrangements and customizations are in place, buyer firms can use Blockchain technologies effectively to procure 
input materials that would serve customer requirements better. The rich communication enabled by Blockchain 
allows firms to transmit features, specifications, and requirements much more succinctly and accurately to suppliers. 
Smart contracts can be used to optimize the global supply chain for buyers, suppliers, and other stakeholders in the 
supply chain. Suppliers and buyers normally have different and conflicting objectives. For instance, suppliers want 
buyers to commit themselves to purchase large quantities of products in stable volumes with flexible delivery dates. 
Conversely, buyers need to be flexible to their customers’ needs and changing demands. The difficulty with global 
optimization is that it requires firms to surrender decision-making power to an unbiased decision-maker. Using 
 
 
Blockchain technology, buyers and suppliers can design supply contracts to maximize profit on the supply chain 
with more visibility into demand, inventory, and upstream/downstream operations through a trusted and secure 
network. Additionally, interactions and agreements can be saved automatically with a traceable record. 
One critical element of supply chain contracts is related to the money flows through the supply chain, i.e., supply 
chain finance. Suppliers often sell their goods and services to their buyers on credit rather than requesting immediate 
cash payment. When the suppliers extend trade credits to the buyers in the form of accounts receivable, they are 
exposing themselves to the buyer’s demand risk and default risk (Jing & Seidmann, 2014; Yang & Birge, 2018). 
Essentially, the supply chain relationship between a buyer and a supplier is grounded in the financing contracts 
stipulating the terms of trade finance, which enables the buyer to finance its purchase of goods and services from the 
supplier. In the United States, the nonfinancial firms in aggregate have extended about 210 billion dollars worth of 
trade credit in 2017, almost equal amount of external financing to their bank loans (Federal Reserve, 2018). Through 
the process of extending and collecting trade credit, the supplier’s working capital can inflate unnecessarily and the 
cash flow problem may occur, which threatens the effectiveness of the buyer-supplier relationship (Fabbri & 
Klapper 2016). As such, the supply chain financing mechanism draws attention from all stakeholders along the 
supply chain.  
 
Historically, the factoring, the sale of accounts receivable to a financial institution, has been used as one common 
method of mitigating the risk from trade credit (Mian & Smith, 1992). While the involvement of third-party 
financial institutions in the supply chain relationship is costly, a large factor with established credit-risk evaluation 
teams and procedures can improve the overall efficiency of the supply chain by managing the trade credits more 
efficiently than an individual supplier’s own management of accounts receivable. However, when a supplier is 
relatively smaller and has sub-par credit quality, the financing costs of the factoring can be substantial, especially for 
the recourse factoring of the receivables from multiple buyers. In particular, as supply chains get longer and more 
global, information collection and credit-risk assessment of a complex portfolio of various suppliers becomes more 
challenging and incurs larger costs associated with the trade credits and factoring. 
 
More recently, a new form of supply chain financing mechanism emerges, often referred to as reverse factoring to 
reduce the transaction costs arising from supply chain financing. Different from the traditional factoring, reverse 
factoring is initiated by a large buyer to leverage its higher credit quality to lower the suppliers’ trade financing costs 
while the buyer’s payments are continued to be delayed. For instance, Wal-Mart has been maintaining a reverse 
factoring platform with thousands of suppliers, called the Supplier Alliance Program, since 2013. When Wal-Mart’s 
purchase order is placed and a supplier delivers the goods, the invoice for the transaction is submitted by the 
supplier to the reverse factoring platform backed by a group of banks including Wells Fargo and Citi Bank. Upon 
the approval of the invoice by Wal-Mart, the funding bank can enable the platform to remit the corresponding 
payment to the supplier after verifying all documents.  
 
 
For any supply chain financing mechanism, including both traditional factoring and reverse factoring, the most 
critical determinant of financing cost is related to assuring the integrity of the transaction information, i.e., 
information asymmetry. When a supplier is young and small, and accordingly, lacking track record and reputation, 
supply chain financiers (factors) may charge prohibitively high financing costs to protect themselves from 














unfathomable credit risk. Even for reverse factoring, the collection and verification of transaction information may 
increase overall financing costs and delay the remittance of payments to the supplier.  There exists a federal warning 
that the fraud related to Letter of Credit, one of the most commonly used supply chain payment guarantees, often 
occurs when the transaction documents have tampered (FBI, 2019) To the extent that Blockchain technology 
enables the irreversibility of trade records through peer-to-peer transmissions along a global supply chain (Kokina, 
Mancha, & Pachamanova, 2017; Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017), monetary and nonmonetary transaction costs related to 
the operation of a complex web of information exchange would be reduced and the overall effectiveness of the 




The study by IBM (IBM, 2017) states that six in ten of the organizations who have started using Blockchain feel that 
the technology creates trust and transparency in both data and transactions. Data recorded to a Blockchain can verify 
that products are maintained according to specifications. For example, Blockchain can verify that wine in transit was 
stored at the proper temperature and humidity condition. As goods in transit clear customs and ports, organizations 
can be made aware of their location in real-time. Such stored data can dynamically optimize supply chains.  
Borkovich and Breese (2016) further developed Batteau (2010) who found that societies are made up of complex 
webs of trust, mistrust, and disinformation among groups, individuals, and institutions learned over years of 
interaction. There exists a fervent crisis of trust extending through all organizations and industries (Werbach, 2018). 
Borkovich and Breese-Vitelli (2014) leaned on the underpinnings of Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions research; 
stating trust can be described in terms of layers of close familial relations extending outward like layers of onion 
through colleagues, an organization, and society more broadly.  Empirical research by House, Hanges, Javidan, 
Dorfman, and Gupta, (2004) on trust factors and their interrelationships based on cultural influences resulted in 
findings on trust as a cornerstone in transactions.  In economic terms, trust relates to the reduced transaction costs 
and monitoring transactions allowing for flexibility in a relationship (Werbach, 2018).   
Trusted relationships in this manner may eliminate the need for regulations by a broader entity and place in in the 
hands of the transactional players and the community more broadly (Casey and Paul, 2018).  Trust in the overall 
framework described has multiple aspects in this paper; relational, contractual, shared ledger, and overall security 
are enveloped.  
 














Reverse logistics and their associated activities result in additional costs in the supply chain when compared to 
forward logistics regardless of the additional potential associated revenue (John, Sridharan, Kumar, 2018). The 
forward chain involves ‘traditional’ conditions purchasing from suppliers, producing products, and distribution to 
end customers (Tombido, Louw, van Eeden, 2018). Simply stated, reverse logistics is anything that goes the 
opposite way of the traditional forward supply chain in the form of returns (Le Blanc, 2006). Reverse logistics can 
have varying levels of difficulty with associated costs based on the products involved and their use (Guide & 
Wassenhove, 2009).  John et al. (2018) and other similar research (John, & Sridharan, 2015) delve deeper into 
mathematical models weighting differences such as consumer, service, recalls, warranty, end-of-use, end-of-life 
returns; however, this paper generalizes the variances for the purpose of an overall theoretical framework. Zang, 
Cao, Min, and Wang, (2019) enter customer preference into reverse logistics also providing mathematical models.  
While Euchi, Bouzidi, and Bouzidi (2019) further customer satisfaction identifying relationships as a key factor 
furthering the ‘trust’ factor the theoretical models, trust, in particular, espoused in this paper.  
Blockchain provides unique technological qualities, such as immutability, automaticity, pseudonymity, and 
irreversibility, which in turn may result in unparalleled reliability, transparency, and efficiency in the supply chain 
(Treiblmaier, 2018). A pioneer in the execution of logistics is Maersk, one of the biggest containers’ carrier in the 
world. They use a Blockchain solution to track their containers and paperwork for customs. This technology negates 
the possibility of fraud when it is physically delivered (Hackius & Petersen, 2017). 
Blockchain technology can be an enabler of a circular, economy, closed-loop supply chains, and reverse logistics 
(Saberi Kouhizadeh, Sarkis, & Shen, 2019; Zang, Cao, Min, & Wang, 2019). Blockchain technology, with its 
inexpensive investments, can improve the entire logistics workflow for all parties involved in the logistics process 




Werbach (2018) stated distributed ledgers broadly referred to in this paper as ‘Blockchain’ is the first technology in 
twenty years to have similar impact potential as the internet; however, still in its infancy, success will be determined 
by technology advances, legal and governance challenges, and adoption. Perspectives to explain the potential for 
‘disruption’ on the supply chain industry by the added umbrella of security through decentralization and reliability 
were provided through the two theoretical model frameworks Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory and Social 
Exchange Theory (SET). TCE theory involves a transaction cost incurred in making an economic exchange, for 
example, costs required to come to an acceptable agreement with the other party to the transaction, drawing up an 
appropriate contract, etc.  SET culminates the understanding of human social behavior in economic undertakings 
providing an examination of the inter-organizational exchange relationship between two firms. The use of Smart 
Contracts placed additional emphasis on the security of Blockchains in supplier customization leading to a 
heightened level of trust by all parties. Both the theoretical model frameworks and the supporting literature provide 
deep insight into Blockchain as the future technology innovation in the supply chain. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION 
 
Prediction of future waves of adoption can assist smaller companies to begin to move in the direction of the 
technology prior to being dictated to do so by larger transaction partners which could both add to the cost of overall 
business transactions and lessens the time for proper planning.  Inclusion of the Diffusion of Innovation Theory 
which describes the benefits of early adoption Rodgers (1962) could add depth to the implications of this and future 
research.   Future research will gather empirical data from industry experts to test, add, and potentially change the 
model for the purposed of predicting industry technology adoption in this area.  Finally, trust, cooperation, and 
reverse logistics were explored to explain how the security in Blockchain can be used for information sharing and 
will remain the focal points for future research. The future of trust is a compelling point of focus with the erosion of 
close relationships; however, the ability for technology to add this crucial element to transactional relationships is 
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